

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NICOSI 02298 01 OF 04 070943Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----130012 070957Z /13

P R 070915Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8275
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 NICOSIA 2298

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY, US
SUBJECT: NIMETZ VISIT TO CYPRUS: DISCUSSIONS WITH ROLANDIS AND
FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS, SEPTEMBER 4-5

SUMMARY: COUNSELOR NIMETZ, AMBASSADOR, DCM AND OTHER
MEMBERS OF PARTY MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ROLANDIS,
DIRECTOR-GENERAL PELAGHIAS AND OTHER GOC OFFICIALS FOR
THREE-AND-A-HALF HOURS SEPTEMBER 4-5 PLUS A WORKING
DINNER. ROLANDIS UNDERSCORED GOC DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD,
AND EXPLAINED AT LENGTH VARIOUS MECHANISMS UNDER DIS
CUSSION WITHIN GOC FOR STIMULATING RESUMPTION OF TALKS:
KYPRIANOU-ECEVIT MEETING, FAMAGUSTA "DOOR", AND ENHANCED USSYG
INTERMEDIARY ROLE. ONLY OPTION EXCLUDED WAS RETURN TO TABLE
ON BASIS -- WHOLLY OR IN PART -- OF EXISTING TURKISH
CYPRIOT PROPOSALS. ROLANDIS SAID THAT GOC COULD NOT
ABANDON PARALLEL INTERNATIONALIZATION TRACK, BUT WOULD
TEMPER ANY ACTION IN THIS AREA IN LIGHT OF PROSPECTS
FOR DIRECT DIALOGUE. HE NOTED THAT U.S. HAD IMPORTANT
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 NICOSI 02298 01 OF 04 070943Z

ROLE TO PLAY IN ENCOURAGING CYPRUS SETTLEMENT, AND
EXPRESSED HOPE THAT EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR ROLE COULD BE
PRESERVED. END SUMMARY.

1. NIMETZ AND AMBASSADOR MET PRIVATELY WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER PRIOR TO FORMAL SESSION SEPTEMBER 4.
ROLANDIS MADE POINT THAT U.S. ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS TO

FIND SETTLEMENT TO CYPRUS PROBLEM RAISED SOME INTERNAL POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR GOC GIVEN OPPOSITION OF EDEK (RADICAL-SOCIALIST) AND AKEL (COMMUNIST) PARTIES TO SUCH A ROLE. HE INDICATED IT MIGHT BE EASIER IF NEUTRAL COUNTRY SUCH AS AUSTRIA BECAME INVOLVED IN PROBLEM, AND ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING AUSTRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PAHR FOLLOWING HIS FORTHCOMING OFFICIAL VIST TO PRAGUE. HE THOUGHT THAT AN AUSTRIAN ROLE COULD ALSO BE SEEN AS COMING MORE CLEARLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. AN AUSTRIAN MIGHT BE GIVEN SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY IN PROMOTING A SOLUTION.

2. AT OUTSET OF EXPANDED MEETING, ROLANDIS BRIEFLY REVIEWED NIMETZ' MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOOU THAT MORNING. HE STRESSED THAT GOC INDEED WANTED TO SOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, BUT THAT NEGOTIATION ON THE BASIS OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT APRIL 13 PROPOSALS WAS SIMPLY OUT OF THE QUESTION. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD LOSE ALL STANDING WITH ITS PEOPLE IF IT PURSUED SUCH A COURSE. ROLANDIS EMPHASIZED THAT SUBSTANTIAL PREPARATORY WORK WOULD BE NECESSARY IF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WERE TO BE PRODUCTIVE. HE NOTED THAT ECEVIT HAD TOLD HIM PERSONALLY IN NEW YORK IN EARLY JUNE THAT HE ALSO WANTED A SETTLEMENT ON CYPRUS.

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PAGE 03 NICOSI 02298 01 OF 04 070943Z

3. WHILE THE ENSUING DISCUSSIONS COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF CYPRUS ISSUES, THE FOCUS FOR THE MOST PART WAS ON METHODS THAT COULD BE EMPLOYED TO BRING ABOUT FRUITFUL NEGOTIATIONS. ROLANDIS PROPOSED THREE OPTIONS: (A) A SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN KYPRIANOOU AND ECEVIT, WHICH WOULD RESOLVE THE ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE AND COULD BE FOLLOWED BY MORE DETAILED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS; (B) TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE FAMAGUSTA "DOOR" TOWARD RESUMING INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS ON AN OPEN AGENDA FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF FAMAGUSTA; AND (C) WITHDRAWAL OF EITHER THE 1978 TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS OR THE EXISTING GREEK CYPRIOT AND TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS, AFTER WHICH A MEDIATOR ACTING UNDER UN AEGIS COULD SEEK TO BUILD UP A BASIS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

4. SUMMIT MEETING: ROLANDIS EXPLAINED THAT THE GOC FELT THAT A MEETING BETWEEN ECEVIT AND KYPRIANOOU COULD FOCUS ON AND RESOLVE THE TWO ISSUES THAT SEEMED TO BE AT THE HEART OF TURKISH CYPRIOT CONCERNS -- THEIR SECURITY AND THEIR ECONOMIC STATUS UNDER A FUTURE FEDERAL REGIME. IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THE DEMILITARIZATION PLAN PUT FORWARD BY KYPRIANOOU AT THE SSOD OFFERED A SOLUTION TO THE SECURITY

PROBLEM. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE PREPARED TO ALLOW THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO HAVE THEIR "FAIR SHARE" OF PUBLIC REVENUE AND TO CONSIDER MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE TURKISH CYPRIOT ENTERPRISE. AFTER AGREEMENT ON THESE ISSUES HAD BEEN ACHIEVED, THE INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATORS COULD THEN SET TO WORK TO REVISE THE 1960 CONSTITUTION AS NECESSARY.

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PAGE 01 NICOSI 02298 02 OF 04 071914Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00
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-----003880 071919Z /42 13

P R 070915Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8276
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 NICOSIA 2298

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR PARA SIX

5. NIMETZ CAUTIONED ROLANDIS NOT TO UNDERESTIMATE THE TURKISH CYPRIOT CONCERN OVER SECURITY. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN A DOMINANT THEME IN OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH DENKTASH AND OTHERS; EVEN THOUGH THEIR SENSE OF INSECURITY MIGHT BE MORE PSYCHOLOGICALLY THAN RATIONALLY BASED, IT WAS NONETHELESS A FACT. OUR FEELING WAS THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD BE SATISFIED ONLY IF THEY HAD A SEPARATE ZONE IN CYPRUS, AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT GIVE UP THIS GOAL IN EXCHANGE FOR DEMILITARIZATION. NIMETZ SAID THAT WE ENVISAGED CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL AND LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN ARRANGING AN ECEVIT-KYPRIANOU MEETING, AND THAT WE WERE UNSURE WHETHER THE TURKS WOULD AGREE TO THE IDEA. IF SUCH A MEETING WERE ARRANGED, THERE WOULD NEED TO BE THOROUGH ADVANCE PREPARATIONS --

FORMAT, SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED, EVEN COMMUNIQUE --
IF IT WAS TO BE PRODUCTIVE. NIMETZ STRESSED THAT IT
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PAGE 02 NICOSI 02298 02 OF 04 071914Z

WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR US TO TALK TO THE TURKS ON
THIS SUBJECT AGAIN IF WE HAD A CLEARER IDEA OF THE GOC'S
PURPOSE. IN RESPONSE TO ROLANDIS' QUERY, NIMETZ SAID
THAT WE FELT THAT A LOWER-LEVEL OFFICIAL MEETING OR
SOME NON-GOVERNMENT CYPRIOT-TURKISH CONTACT MIGHT BE
MORE FEASIBLE THAN A HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING.

6. RETURNING TO THIS SUBJECT IN MORNING SESSION
SEPTEMBER 5, ROLANDIS STRESSED THAT THE GOC MUCH PRE-
FERRED A SUMMIT TO A LOWER-LEVEL MEETING. HE STRESSED
THAT THE GOC GENUINELY SOUGHT TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS
THROUGH SUCH A MEETING, AND THAT KYPRIANOU WAS NOT
INTERESTED SIMPLY IN GAINING RECOGNITION -- WHICH HE
ALREADY HAD ANYWAY. (EFFORTS TO SMOKE OUT GOC INTENTIONS
MORE CONCRETELY YIELDED LITTLE.) IF THE TURKS INSISTED
THAT DENKTASH BE PRESENT, THE GOC COULD AGREE TO THIS
PROVIDED THAT A FOURTH PERSON (UNSPECIFIED, BUT
PRESUMABLY A GREEK CYPRIOT) ATTEND ALSO. THEY WOULD
ALSO AGREE TO DROPPING ALL TITLES, EACH PARTICIPANT
BEING REFERRED TO SIMPLY AS "HIS EXCELLENCY." EACH
COULD UNILATERALLY DEFINE THE ROLE IN WHICH HE WAS
ATTENDING THE MEETING, BUT THERE WOULD BE A GENERAL
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT ATTENDANCE DID NOT IMPLY
RECOGNITION OF SUCH UNILATERAL TITLES. ROLANDIS
AGREED THAT THERE WOULD NEED TO BE AN AGENDA, BUT ONE
THAT WOULD ALLOW CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY. HE SUGGESTED
THAT, FOLLOWING U.S. APPROACHES TO THE TURKS, A
PREPARATORY MEETING BE CONVENED BY THE UNITED NATIONS
TO DRAW UP THE AGENDA AND SET GUIDELINES.

7. NIMETZ STRESSED THAT HE COULD NOT COMMIT THE USG TO
FOLLOWING UP ON THIS IDEA. HE NOTED THAT THE
SECRETARY HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN EARLIER EFFORTS TO ARRANGE
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PAGE 03 NICOSI 02298 02 OF 04 071914Z

A KYPRIANOU-ECEVIT MEETING. HE UNDERTOOK TO EXPLORE THE
POSSIBILITIES.

8. FAMAGUSTA/VAROSHA: ROLANDIS PREFACED HIS ANALYSIS OF
THE FAMAGUSTA "DOOR" OPTION WITH A THOROUGH CRITIQUE OF
DENKTASH'S VAROSHA PROPOSAL. THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE ON
FOUR MAIN COUNTS: (1) UN OR TRIPARTITE ADMINISTRATION

WAS QUITE IMPRACTICAL, THE ONLY LOGICAL SOLUTION BEING THAT THE RETURNING INHABITANTS SHOULD BE UNDER GOC ADMINISTRATION AND LAWS; (2) THE AREA DEFINED BY DENKTASH AS SUBJECT TO RESETTLEMENT WOULD ACCOMMODATE ONLY 13,000 PERSONS (SOME 40 PERCENT OF THE CITY'S POPULATION) AND WOULD NOT BE VIABLE IN THAT IT EXCLUDED THE COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL SECTORS, THE UTILITIES, ETC.; (3) THE CLEAR IMPLICATION IN DENKTASH'S STATEMENTS WAS THAT THE TURKS WOULD REASSUME CONTROL SHOULD INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS FAIL; AND (4) THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR SECURE ACCESS FROM THE PRESENT GREEK ZONE. ROLANDIS SAID THAT THE GOC SOUGHT RETURN OF THE ENTIRE MUNICIPALITY OF FAMAGUSTA (EXCEPTING THE OLD PART OF THE CITY) TO GOC CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION, ON A PERMANENT BASIS. IF THE TURKS WERE TO MAKE SUCH A GOODWILL GESTURE, INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS COULD THEN BE RESUMED WITH AN OPEN AGENDA ON THE BASIS OF UN RESOLUTIONS AND THE MAKARIOS-DENKTASH GUIDELINES. ROLANDIS SAID THAT HE FULLY APPRECIATED TURKISH CYPRIOT SECURITY CONCERNS OVER FAMAGUSTA HARBOR AND THE WALLS OF THE OLD CITY, AND THAT THE GOC WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE THESE INTO ACCOUNT.

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PAGE 01 NICOSI 02298 03 OF 04 071030Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----130255 071031Z /12

P R 070915Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8277
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 NICOSIA 2298

EXDIS

9. NIMETZ MAINTAINED THAT THE GOC COULD NOT REALISTICALLY EXPECT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO ACCEPT KYPRIANOU'S

FAMAGUSTA PROPOSAL AS IS THE GOC SHOULD APPRECIATE THE MAJOR POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR THEM OF SURRENDERING SO VALUABLE AN ASSET IN ADVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS WHY UN ADMINISTRATION SEEMED AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE. NIMETZ AGREED THAT THE PHRASE "UNAEGIS" WAS VERY VAGUE, BUT NOTED THAT THIS COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING THE UN AND THE CYPRIOT PARTIES. HE URGED THAT THE GOC AGREE TO THE UN PROBING THE POINTS OF DIFFERENCE, STRESSING THAT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON FAMAGUSTA WOULD DRAW INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO CYPRUS AND THUS HELP KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE TURKISH SIDE IN SUBSEQUENT INTERCOMMUNAL DISCUSSIONS. NIMETZ AGREED THAT THE RETURNING INHABITANTS OF VAROSHA COULD NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE TO NEGOTIATING PROGRESS AND THAT RESETTLEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE PERMANENT. HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT CYPRIOT LAWS SHOULD PREVAIL IN THE RESETTLED PORTION OF THE CITY, AND SUGGESTED THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 NICOSI 02298 03 OF 04 071030Z

A DEFINITION OF THE AREA TO BE RESETTLED COULD PERHAPS BE ARRIVED AT WITH THE HELP OF AN INTERMEDIARY. ONE IDEA WOULD BE TO RESETTLE THE CITY BY STAGES; CONSIDERABLE CLEAN-UP AND RESTORATIVE WORK WOULD IN ANY CASE BE REQUIRED.

10. A NEUTRAL INTERMEDIARY, IN DISCUSSING THE THIRD OPTION FOR INDUCING MOVEMENT TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT, ROLANDIS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE GOC REGARDS THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS OF APRIL 13 AS "PARTITIONIST" AND NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO SATISFACTORY AMENDMENT. THERE ALSO WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF THE GOC AGREEING TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF BOTH THESE AND THEIR OWN APRIL 1;77 PROPOSALS: EITHER THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS SHOULD WITHDRAW THEIR PROPOSALS AND AGREE TO TALK ON THE BASIS OF THE GREEK CYRIOT ONES, OR BOTH SIDES SHOULD WITHDRAW THEIR PROPOSALS AND FIND SOME OTHER POINT OF DEPARTURE. NIMETZ NOTED THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD IN RECENT MONTHS UNDERSCORED THEIR FLEXIBILITY AND READINESS TO RETURN TO THE TABLE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. ON OUR ESTIMATE, THEY FELT REASONABLY COMFORTABLE WHERE THEY WERE NOW. IF WE WERE TO PRESS THE TURKISH SIDE FURTHER, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR US TO KNOW MORE FULLY WHAT THE GOC WANTED OF THEM. ROLANDIS INDICATED THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS PUBLIC RATHER THAN PRIVATE EVIDENCE OF FLEXIBILITY, THAT WOULD MAKE IT POLITICALLY POSSIBLE FOR THE GOC TO RETURN TO THE TABLE.

11. THINKING ALOUD, ROLANDIS ASKED WHETHER SOMEONE FROM THE UN COULD BE TASKED WITH DRAFTING NEW PROPOSALS. NIMETZ NOTED THAT IT WAS POLITICALLY DIFFICULT FOR ONE SIDE TO ACCEPT THE OTHER'S PROPOSALS AS A NEGOTIATING

BASE, AND THAT HAVING A THIRD PARTY PUT SOMETHING CON-
CRETE ON THE TABLE PERHAPS AFFORDED THE ONLY WAY OUT.
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PAGE 03 NICOSI 02298 03 OF 04 071030Z

ONE DRAWBACK WAS THAT THE TURKISH SIDE WOULD NOT READILY
ACCEPT SUCH A TACTIC. ONE COURSE, NIMETZ SAID, WOULD
BE FOR WALDHEIM TO APPOINT A PANEL OF EXPERTS TO DRAFT
PROPOSALS: AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD HAVE THIRD PARTIES
GRATUITOUSLY OFFERING PROPOSALS TO THE UN. ROLANDIS
SIAD THAT WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WAS FOR A SINGLE MEDIATOR,
ACTING UNDER THE UN, TO CONSULT IN DEPTH WITH BOTH SIDES
AND BUILD UP A SET OF PROPOSALS FOR TALKS. HE WOULD
BE TALKING WITH THE AUSTRIANS SHORTLY TO SEE WHETHER
THEY WOULD BE INTERESTED IN PROVIDING AN INDIVIDUAL FOR
SUCH A MISSION ON BEHALF OF THE UNSYG. IF THE AUSTRIANS
WERE AGREEABLE, HE (ROLANDIS) WOULD BROACH THE SUGGESTION
WITH WALDHEIM IN NEW YORK LATER IN SEPTEMBER. NIMETZ
COMMENTED THAT SUCH A SCHEME WOULD STAND A MUCH BETTER
CHANCE OF SUCCESS IF IT WERE NOT SEEN AS A GOC INITIATIVE;
ONCE THE AUSTRIANS HAD AGREED, IT SHOULD BE LEFT UP TO
WALDHEIM TO APPROACH BOTH PARTIES FORMALLY WITH THE IDEA.
WHEN ASKED WHAT WOULD BECOME OF GALINDO-POHL'S ROLE,
ROLANDIS SIAD THAT HE COULD REMAIN ON CYPRUS AS SRSG WITH
THE FUNCTION OF MONITORING THE SITUATION HERE AND WORKING
ON OTHER PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. THE AUSTRIAN, ON THE OTHER
HAND, WOULD BE A SPECIAL ROVING ADVISER.

12. IN DISCUSSING EACH OF THESE OPTIONS FOR INDUCING
PROGRESS, ROLANDIS STRESSED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE
AUTHORITY TO COMMIT THE GOC TO ONE CERTAIN COURSE OR
ANOTHER. ALL DECISIONS HAD TO BE TAKEN WITHIN THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND THE NATIONAL COUNCIL. NIMETZ
MADE THE POINT THAT THREE OPTIONS UNDER DISCUSSIONS WERE
NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE BUT COULD BE COMBINED SOMEHOW.

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PAGE 01 NICOSI 02298 04 OF 04 071039Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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P R 070915Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8278
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 NICOSIA 2298

EXDIS

13. NIMETZ RECOMMENDED STRONGLY TO GOC SIDE THAT, IN ADDITION TO THESE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES, MEASURES BE TAKEN TO BUILD UP A SENSE OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. ONE OF THE REASONS, PERHAPS, FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS' FEELING OF INSECURITY WAS THE ABSENCE OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES; THERE WAS A GENERATION GROWING UP ON EITHER SIDE THAT DID NOT KNOW ITS COUNTERPARTS ON THE OTHER. NIMETZ SUGGESTED THAT PROFESSIONAL AND OTHER PRIVATE GROUPS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO ENTER INTO CONTACT WITH THEIR OPPOSITE MEMBERS IN TURKISH CYPRUS, ON A NON-POLITICAL PLANE. EITHER WE OR THE UN COULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD. PELAGHIAS SAID THE GOC WOULD FAVOR SUCH CONTACTS, AND MENTIONED THE PERIODIC MEETINGS OF THE RESPECTIVE STUDENT ASSOCIATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE AS A CASE IN POINT. PELAGHIAS ASSERTED, HOWEVER, THAT DENKTASH'S POLICY WAS TO PROHIBIT ANY CONTACT WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 NICOSI 02298 04 OF 04 071039Z

14. CYPRUS AT THE UN: NIMETZ STATED THAT WHILE WE RECOGNIZED THAT THE GOC PERCEIVED THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AS A WORTHWHILE FOCUS OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY, WE ALSO BELIEVED THAT AN ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE WITHIN UN FORA WOULD NOT BE CONDUCTIVE TO THE PRACTICAL APPROACHES WE WERE DISCUSSING. IF POSSIBLE, THE CYPRUS ISSUE SHOULD BE HANDLED AT THE UN IN A MANNER THAT WOULD NOT GENERATE CHARGES AND COUNTERCHARGES. ROLANDIS AND PELAGHIAS STRESSED THAT THE GOC COULD NOT "DE-INTERNATIONALIZE" THE ISSUE; TURKEY'S STRENGTH LAY IN ITS MILITARY PRESENCE, THE GOC'S IN ITS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. NEVERTHELESS, THEY WISHED TO PURSUE PRACTICAL APPROACHES IN PARALLEL WITH THEIR INTERNATIONAL EFFORT, RECOGNIZING, OF COURSE, THAT PROGRESS IN DIRECT TALKS WOULD DECREASE THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTIONS OF SUPPORT. ANY RECOURSE TO

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE DECIDED ON IN THIS LIGHT.

15. A USG ROLE: ROLANDIS SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE US HAD AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN RESOLVING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM ON ACCOUNT OF OUR CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED, AND THAT HE WISHED TO SEE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR ROLE PRESERVED. IN THIS LIGHT, HE HOPED WE WOULD AVOID ANYTHING THAT WOULD TEND TO SUBSTANTIATE THE VIEW OF THE AVERAGE CYPRIOT THAT THE CURRENT NIMETZ MISSION WAS DESIGNED SIMPLY TO SERVE THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEEDS UNDER THE NEW EMBARGO LEGISLATION. NIMETZ SAID HE COULD APPRECIATE THIS, AND THAT FOR US TO PROCLAIM PROGRESS WHEN THERE WAS NONE WOULD BE DISTINCTLY HARMFUL. IF ANYTHING, WE INTENDED TO SAY THAT THE PROBLEM WAS VERY DIFFICULT. NIMETZ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ASSISTANCE OF THE U.S. AND OF OTHER PARTIES WOULD BE NECESSARY IF PROGRESS WAS TO BE ACHIEVED. ANY THIRD COUNTRY MEDIATOR, CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 NICOSI 02298 04 OF 04 071039Z

FOR EXAMPLE, WAS BOUND TO BE UNPOPULAR WITH THE TWO CYPRIOT PARTIES, AND WE AND OTHERS COULD HELP SIGNIFICANTLY IN PROMOTING ANY SUCH EFFORT.

16. THE EMBARGO "CONDITIONS": THIS BEING SAID, NIMETZ NOTED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OVER THE PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION REQUIRED TO LIFT THE EMBARGO. WE DID NOT NEED TO SHOW NEW EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS FOR THIS PURPOSE, BUT MERELY TO AFFIRM THAT TURKEY WAS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS. HE EXPECTED THIS STEP WOULD BE TAKEN SOON AFTER BILL WAS SIGNED. NIMETZ STRESSED THAT LIFTING THE EMBARGO WOULD NOT BE CONDITIONAL ACT. FUTURE PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATIONS HAD TO DO WITH LEVELS OF ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY AND GREECE.

17. NEXT STEPS: SOME DISCUSSION ENSUED AS TO WHAT SUBJECTS NIMETZ SHOULD RAISE WITH DENKTASH. PELAGHIAS ASKED THAT NIMETZ EXPLORE DENKTASH'S VIEWS AS TO CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS RESUMING TALKS, AND URGE HIM TO CEASE TAKING "PARTITIONIST" ACTIONS. NIMETZ SAID HE WOULD ASK DENKTASH FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND OF THE U.S. ROLE IN PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT, AND WOULD RAISE THE FAMAGUSTA PROPOSALS, POSSIBLE INTER-CYPRIOT CONTACTS, AND FUTURE RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE. ROLANDIS URGED THAT ANY SUBSTANTIVE DEVELOPMENTS BE RELAYED BACK TO THE GOC. NIMETZ AND HE AGREED TO REMAIN IN TOUCH, AND TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS DURING THE KYPRIANOU/ROLANDIS VISIT TO NEW YORK FOR THE UNGA. (KYPRIANOU WILL BE IN THE U.S. FOR SEVEN OR EIGHT DAYS BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 25, ROLANDIS FOR SOMETIME LONGER.)

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, VISITS, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 sep 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978NICOSI02298
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780364-0366
Format: TEL
From: NICOSIA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780993/aaaaczfy.tel
Line Count: 494
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Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
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Message ID: feff6856-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1519720
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NIMETZ VISIT TO CYPRUS: DISCUSSIONS WITH ROLANDIS AND FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS, SEPTEMBER 4-5 SUMMARY: COUNSELOR NIMETZ, AMBASSADOR, DCM AND OTH
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY, US, (NIMETZ, MATTHEW), (ROLANDIS, NIKOS)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/feff6856-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014